In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling highlights two common “motivational structures” in the Game of Chicken. The Game of Chicken is not confined only to thrill-seeking motorists. Likewise, if both drivers believe the other will stay the course, then both want to swerve away to earn a higher payoff. If both drivers, for example, believe the other will swerve away, each believes he can earn a higher payoff by staying the course. If either strategic profile is played, neither player has an incentive to change their strategy.Ĭonversely, the strategic profiles in which both players pursue identical strategies are not Nash equilibria. Both strategic profiles are Nash equilibria because swerving is the best response to staying, and vice versa.
We can say, however, that there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (1) Brian stays course, and Dom swerves away and (2) Dom swerves away, and Brian stays course. So, we cannot use an iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS) to find a solution. In this Game of Chicken, neither player has a strictly dominated strategy.
